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ABSTRACT 
-The Ground Proximity W aming System (GPWS) currently fielded on the 
F/A-18A/B/C/D/E/F and AV-8B aircraft"is a great safety-backup system that 
alerts the pilot of an impending Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) condition. 
However, it does have one major limitation: the reliance on the look-down radar 
altimeter, which results in little or no CFiT protection in rising terrain. 
The Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) is the generational 
evolution of GPWS that provides the predictive, or look-ahead, capability sorely 
missing 'rrom the current system. Utilizing aircraft positioning from the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) and an onboard Digital Terrain Elevation Data 
(DTED), TA WS computes recovery trajectories and presents a combination of 
aural and visual warnings when necessary to cue the pilot to avoid a CFiT 
condition. TA WS, without being solely reliant on the radar altimeter, has the 
ability to calculate and present appropriate warnings regardless of aircraft position 
or attitude. Ultimately, TA WS has to walk a fine line between providing timely 
warnings that allow the pilot to conduct maximum performance maneuvering 
during all mission roles, without the impedance of nuisance cues. At the heart of 
TA WS is a generic algorithm that can be tailored to specific aircraft performance 
and mission characteristics. 
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This thesis examines all aspects of the flight test of TA WS: the history of 
GPWS and TA WS in aviation, the conundrum of how to plan a flight test of a 
terrain avoidance system in close proximity to the ground without endangering 
aircrew or aircraft, the use of simulation, additional safety precautions, results, 




The analyses, opinions, conclusions and recommendations expressed 
herein are those of the author and do no represent the official position of the 
Naval Air Warfare Center, the Naval Air Systems Command, or the Department 
of the Navy. Data presented in this thesis were obtained from a Department of the 
Navy test program and not from dedicated flight test to support this thesis project. 
The author's recommendation should not be considered attributable to any of the 
aforementioned authorities or for any purpose other than fulfillment of the thesis 
requirements. 
The author was the project officer for TAWS. Of the many test sorties of 
TAWS he flew, he also executed the first flight and the last test flight of TAWS in 
the F/A-18 developmental test program. 
The Terrain Awareness Warning System {TAWS) discussed in this thesis 
has been tested only in the F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet thus far. The Hornet 
and Super Hornet are highly maneuverable, tactical military aircraft; therefore, 
military TA WS excludes comparison to the system of the same name in civilian 
aircraft. 
A patent was granted in August of 2002 for the TA WS algorithm. 
Therefore, any discussion of the TA WS algorithm will be limited by the 
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AIRCRAFf DESIGNATIONS 
All U.S. military aircraft are designated with a letter denoting the mission 
type followed by a number of that model aircraft. Subsequent letters to the model 
number indicate the model variant. In the course of this thesis, F/A-18 is 
commonly used. The FIA indicates the mission type of Fighter / Attack. The 18 
denotes the model commonly known as the "Hornet". The model variant of "D" 
indicates the fourth version of the Hornet, a two-seat aircraft. The model variant 





THE NEED FOR A CFiT SOLUTION 
"A controlled flight into terrain (CFiT) accident is defined as a collision in 
· which an aircraft, under the control of the crew, is flown into the terrain ( or water) 
with no prior awareness on the part of the crew of the impending disaster." 1 
"CFiT accidents are the most severe aircraft accidents. These kinds of 
accidents occur when an otherwise airworthy airplane is inadvertently flown into 
the ground or water. The number of fatalities per accident is extremely high as 
compared to any other type of accident. They also generally result in complete 
destruction of the airplane."2 
Both of these very stark descriptions of controlled flight into terrain were penned 
by the same author, albeit 16 years apart. Simply stated: throughout aviation 
history, controlled flight into terrain (CFiT) has always been one of the leading 
causes of the loss of aircrew and aircraft. Since 1931 more than 40,000 
passengers and crew have lost their lives in terrain collision accidents worldwide. 3 
Still today, CFiT accidents rank as the number one cause of aviation fatalities 
worldwide with 60% of fatalities over the last ten years attributed to CFIT 
accidents.4 The ultimate toll in terms of both man and machine is always 
extracted in a CFiT accident as the ground always wins the contest. With these 
appalling statistics it was clearly evident that something had to be done to help 
keep pilots from flying a perfectly airworthy aircraft into the ground. In an effort 
to arm the pilot with the necessary cueing to combat CFiT, various Ground 
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Proximity Warning Systems (GPWS) and Ground Collision Avoidance Systems 
(GCAS) have been developed and tested by the military in the last twenty-five 
years. The Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) is the generational 
evolution of GPWS. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF GPWS AND TA WS 
GPWS is a simple system. As its name implies, Ground Proximity 
Warning only alerts the pilot to closeness with the terrain. When it was first 
conceived, technology limited the options for designers. All GPWS to date are 
limited by their sole reliance on the radar altimeter. Radar altimeters are 
instruments mounted on the underside of the aircraft that provide measuring of 
true heigh� above the exact terrain at that exact moment in flight. For aircraft that 
aren't moving or terrain that isn't changing (flat or water), a radar altimeter based 
system can provide acceptable CFiT protection. Unfortunately, some aircraft are 
highly maneuverable frequently flying outside the operating envelope of the radar 
altimeter in terms of high bank and pitch angles. When the terrain is not flat, 
reliance on the radar altimeter precludes any forward or "look-ahead" capability. 
This is due to the radar altimeter staring straight down therefore being unable to 
predict rising terrain in the aircraft's flight path resulting in little or no protection. 
TA WS is a generational evolution of the GPWS providing protection that 
is not limited by only a look-down capability. TAWS was previously known as 
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the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS). TAWS is 
'enhanced' because it uses a terrain database to compare to Global Positioning 
System (GPS) inputs. This ability to know where the aircraft is, where the aircraft 
will be, and the height of the terrain all around the aircraft allows TA WS to alert 
the pilot of terrain that could be in the aircraft's flight path. This is the "look­
ahead" capability missing from the earlier GPWS. 
The requirement for the installation of GPWS in all domestic airliners was 
mandated following the 197 4 TWA crash at Washington Dulles International 
Airport.5 As a result of this initial implementation of GPWS, there was an 
immediate order-of-magnitude reductions in CFiT mishaps of commercial air 
carriers.6 In 1978 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) broadened the 
mandate for GPWS to include smaller jet aircraft with 10 or more passenger 
seats.7 Initially turboprop aircraft were excluded from the mandate because it was 
thought that their slower speeds made them less likely to have a CFiT accident. 
Time has shown, however, that it is not the type of aircraft that is the root cause of 
these CFiT accidents but rather the aircrew who have lost situational awareness. 
In 1992 the FAA correctly expanded the GPWS mandate to turboprops with 10 or 
more passenger seats.7 With the subsequent improvements in technology both in 
and out of the cockpit, the latest mandate effective March 2001 required the 
installation of TA WS in all U.S. registered turbine-powered aircraft with 6 or 





29 March 02 must immediately meet TA WS requirements while aircraft 
manufactured before that date must augment or replace existing GPWS systems 
by 29 March 2005.8 
The effort to reduce CFiT accidents is truly global, not just a domestic 
U. S. concern. The International Civil Aviation Organization (!CAO) works with 
the U. S. FAA to ensure compliance by regional civil aviation authorities. The 
international community is working to meet the 1 January 2003 deadline for 
installation of TA WS in all aircraft with 30 or more passenger seats and a 
maximum takeoff gross weight of greater than 33, 067 lbs.9 Many foreign aircraft 
manufacturers have also developed GPWS and TA WS-like systems for many of 
their military aircraft. 
THE MILITARY APPLICATION OF GPWS AND TA WS 
Mil itary aircraft operate in much more varied conditions and l arger flight 
envelopes than do civil aircraft. Therefore, military system operating 
requirements for GPWS or TA WS are much more robust than those for civil 
aircraft. Military aircrew need directive warnings to recover the aircraft from an 
impending CFiT condition without hindering their ability to fly aggressive 
combat and combat-support missions. 
The Department of the Navy effort to reduce CFIT accidents was initiated 
with the 1987 Operational Requirements Document for GPWS (GPWS ORD).6 
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GPWS has been in operational fleet aircraft, namely the F/A-18 and AV-8B, for 
the last 6 years. It is important to note, however, that GPWS is not a performance 
aid to change the way a pilot would maneuver the aircraft. GPWS is a safety 
backup system only, which assesses the aircraft's current state and alerts the pilot 
of an impending CFiT condition. Early GPWS versions had far too many flight 
regimes wh�re nuisance cues were common. Nuisance cues are those warnings 
that the aircrew believed were invalid or did not require immediate aircrew 
response. Nuisance cues eroded pilot confidence and led to a general pilot 
procedure of disabling the system prior to takeoff. While it could be considered 
b_etter to have extra warnings rather than not enough, consider operations in a 
hostile environment. If the aircrew were conducting low-level flight and received 
a GPWS warning that was false, they may automatically respond to a "pull-up" 
warning abandoning their terrain masking attempts thereby entering a threat 
weapon system envelope putting the aircraft at greater risk. If the warning were 
genuine, then the aircrew would have to avoid the terrain as a first priority and 
then deal with the threat weapon system. Since initial GPWS implementation, 
CFiT has accounted for 29% of all F/A-18 losses. 10 Two subsequently fielded 
versions of GPWS targeted enhancing CFiT protection, while at the same time 
eliminating nuisance cues. Feedback from the fleet indicates that pilot confidence 
in GPWS has improved and maintenance records indicate GPWS usage is now 
normal practice. However, CFiT still ranks third overall behind out-of-control 
flight and engine malfunctions for all of Naval Aviation aircraft losses. 10 
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Enter TA WS, the Navy and Marine Corps first predictive ground 
proximity warning system for tactical aircraft. As aircraft and weapon systems 
became more complex and mission scenarios became increasingly demanding, it 
became clear that the look-down capability of GPWS was providing insufficient 
CFiT protection. This taken with the inherent limitations of GPWS discussed 
previously, drove the Department of the Navy to the capabilities a system like 
TA WS could provide. As stated previously, TA WS implementation in the civil 
· aviation industry is not as robust as that required for military missions. Civil 
adaptations of TA WS do not function at the speeds or incorporate aircraft specific 
parameters that the military version does. The remainder of this thesis will 
address the military implementation of TA WS. Highly complex, TA WS must 
interface with not only the radar altimeter, but also the inertial navigation system, 
global positioning system, air data computer, aircraft mission computer, and 
digital terrain elevation database (DTED). This interfacing allows for increased 
CFiT protection throughout the entire flight regime, flight over wide variations in 
terrain (figure 1) during maneuvers that exceed sensor limits, and during takeoff 
and landing, all without increasing the already heavy pilot workload. 
PURSUIT OF A SOLUTION FOR CFiT 
There are two major philosophical paths that can be taken when pursuing a 
solution for CFiT. One philosophy is to develop a system that will save everyone 
in a CFiT condition. This approach is especially applicable to commercial and 
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Figure 1 
F/A-18A'S OVER THE GRAND CANYON 
Photograph by the Author 
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military-transport aircraft where operations are in well-defined envelopes that are 
rarely exceeded. These flight envelopes are well defined because larger aircraft 
are not highly maneuverable and can be expected to be flown along very 
predictable flight trajectories in the execution of all their missions. The second 
philosophy is to avoid nuisance warnings at all costs. This will result in � system 
that will save most, but not necessarily all, aircraft in a CFIT condition. The U.S. 
Navy and Marine Corps developed GPWS and then TA WS for tactical aircraft 
with the guiding philosophy of avoiding nuisance warnings. 
Once a design philosophy has been determined, two approaches to 
integration with the aircrew and aircraft are available: active or passive. The 
latest U.S. Air Force Ground Collision Avoidance System (GCAS) tested an 
automatic recovery maneuver (active) through the aircraft flight control system if 
the pilot has not taken corrective action by the time a CFIT condition is 
determined.11 The U.S. Air Force has been guided by the "save everyone" 
approach. Navy and Marine Corps development of GPWS and then TA WS, has 
been guided by the selection of the "save most" approach, maintaining the 
requirement to have no nuisance warnings presented to the pilot. This resulted in 
the passive integration with the aircraft (no automatic recovery), but an active set 
of cues to alert the pilot to recover. 
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Nuisance cues or "crying wolf' previously lead to a lack of confidence in 
the system and delays in pilot response to "real" warnings. GPWS and TA WS 
provide warnings only 3 to 7 seconds prior to ground impact. Depending on flight 
conditions, this is not sufficient time for the pilot to determine whether a warning 
is real or not and take corrective action. By relying solely on pilot cueing 
(passive), pilots must understand that they are in an emergency situation, believe 
the cues presented to them are real and respond with minimal reaction time. 
However, in the pursuit to eliminate nuisance cues there lies the risk of 
inadvertently reducing CFiT protection. In the end, the goal of the TAWS 
approach is to allow the pilot to continue flying in all flight regimes they do now 




WHAT IS TAWS? 
TAWS DESCRIPTION 
The sole purpose of GPWS and TA WS is to warn the pilot that ground 
impact is imminent and provide an indication of what corrective action should be 
taken via visual and aural cues. GPWS is an algorithm integrated into the aircraft 
mission computer software configuration set. GPWS inputs and operation are 








GPWS INPUTS AND OPERATION 
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In comparison, TA WS is an algorithm integrated in the Digital Map Computer 
(DMC) of the Tactical Aircraft Moving MAp Capability (T AMMAC) system. 
The T AMMAC system provides the latest generation of digital moving map 
cockpit presentation that is combined with a new capability to view previously 
stored imagery. Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED), or the digital portion of 
the map containing elevation data, is co-located with the TAWS algorithm in the 
DMC. TA WS inputs, operation, and recovery trajectories are depicted in figure 3. 
G1/D'fED 







TAWS INPUTS, OPERATION, AND RECOVERY TRAJECTORIES 
1 1  
TA WS compares the DTED to the aircraft position obtained from GPS and INS to 
predict potential ground impact. This allows TA WS to provide the foiward, or 
look-ahead capability, not possible with a radar altimeter reliant system such as 
GPWS. The predicted recovery profile, described in the next section, 1s 
presented to the pilot who then executes the escape maneuver. 
Areas of CFIT protection are based on aircraft mission, aircraft type and 
installed systems available to implement TA WS. Areas of CFIT protection by 
TA WS include: excessive rate of descent, excessive closure with terrain, negative 
climb rate or altitude loss after takeoff, flight into terrain when not in a landing 
configuration, excessive bank angle, and excessive descent below glideslope on 
an instrument approach. 6 
There are several basic fundamentals and assumptions in the design and 
function ofTAWS. First, TA WS queries the DTED up to 340 times per second 
requiring the TA WS algorithm to reside in the same location (T AMMAC DMC) 
as the DTED. Second, TA WS predicts the pilot will require 1 .3 seconds to 
acknowledge the warning and initiate a recovery. Third, the TA WS minimum 
terrain clearance altitude is set at 50 ft Above Ground Level (AGL) for aircraft in 
the cruise configuration (gear: up, flaps: automatic). Fourth, the predicted 
recovery assumes the aircraft will be rolled to wings-level (if so required), and 
loaded to a load factor of 5 ( or 80% of available load factor when below best 
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maneuvering airspeed). Fifth, TA WS assumes the throttles will be retarded to 
IDLE when above best maneuvering airspeed and set to maximum afterburner 
when below. This allows for an accurate prediction of the acceleration during the 
recovery and the potential change in available load factor. 
Operationally, as aircraft location is determined and altitude is adjusted for 
sensor and DTED errors, TA WS utilizes this fused sensor data to continuously 
compute two recovery trajectories, vertical and oblique. 10 The vertical recovery 
trajectory (VRT) assumes the aircraft will be rolled to wings-level followed by a 
longitudinal pull to a load factor of 5 ( or 80% of available). The oblique recovery 
trajectory (ORT) assumes the current bank angle will be maintained and an 
increase in load factor to 5 (or 80% of available) in the turn will follow. The 
recovery trajectories are broken down to five components that make up the 
recovery. The components are: the pilot response delay, roll response delay, load 
factor-delay phase, load factor-onset phase, and dive recovery phase. The vertical 
and oblique recovery trajectories are depicted in figure 4. As long as one of the 
constantly computed trajectories does not intercept the DTED, no warning is 
issued because there is still a way out of the potential CFiT. If both recovery 
trajectories intersect the terrain database, then a pilot warning is presented. The 
use of two recovery trajectories greatly reduces the probability of nuisance 
warrungs. 
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Figure 4 
TAWS VERTICAL AND OBLIQUE RECOVERY TRAJECTORIES 
Figure Courtesy of T .E. Anderson 
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Standard commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Personal Computer Memory 
Card International Association (PCMCIA) cards are used for interface between 
pre-flight mission planning and the DMC in the aircraft. The uses of industry 
standard computer cards enhance TA WS in several ways. First, cost is greatly 
reduced due to increased availability. Second, as data storage continues to 
increase over time, cards with more capability can be utilized in the existing 
hardware resident in the aircraft. During pre-mission planning, data is written to 
the cards via the Tactical Aircraft Mission Planning System (TAMPS). 
Additionally, these cards are loaded with a configurable parameter file used to 
configure TA WS for that particular aircraft model. The configurable parameters 
file tells TA WS in what aircraft it is hosted and loads the numerous aircraft 
specific characteristics and performance parameters, this enables TA WS to 
present appropriate and timely warnings for the given platform. Consequently, 
the configurable parameters feature is what enables a single TA WS software build 
to support numerous aircraft platforms. 
TA WS is fully automatic operating 'behind the scene' requiring no pilot 
input. If TA WS were to cease operation, GPWS is still functioning in the 
background within the aircraft mission computer and would provide the same 
"look-down" protection afforded prior to TAWS integration. The most versatile 
feature of TA WS is that at its heart, it is a software algorithm of generic design 
that can be tailored to fit any aircraft with a T AMMAC-like DTED system. 
1 5  
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TA WS COCKPIT CUEING 
TA WS warnings are presented to the pilot through directive voice 
commands and an arrow in the Head Up Display (HUD), figures 5 and 6. The 
HUD arrow always points in the direction of aircraft recovery and is issued 
s imultaneously with the voice command. 
The voice commands or aural warnings are the primary means of alerting 
the pilot to the impending CFiT condition. They act as a wake up call to the pilot 
who has los t situational awareness. The directive nature of the cues is designed to 
require little thought thus minimizing the pilot response delay.· Aural warnings 
consis t of five urgent commands to direct the pilot's initial response. "PULL-
UP .. .. PULL-UP!" is issued if bank angle is less than 45 degrees or the oblique 
recovery is the preferred exi t path. "ROLL-RlGHT . . .  ROLL-RlGHT!" or 
"ROLL-LEFT . . .  ROLL-LEFT!" is issued if the bank angle is greater than 45 deg. 
"POWER . . .  POWER!" is issued if bank angle is less than 45 deg, airspeed is less 
than 200 kts and above the angle of attack threshold. "CHECK GEAR!" is iss ued 
if the aircraft descends below 1 50 ft AGL as if for landing without the landing 
gear extended. The voice messages may be given in combination. The mos t 
common combination would be a "ROLL-RIGHT or LEFT!" followed by a 
"PULL-UP!" voice message. The combination of the directive aural warning and 
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HUD CUE FOR VERTICAL RECOVERY TRAJECTORY WARNING 
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HUD CUE FOR OBLIQUE RECOVERY TRAJECTORY WARNING 
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A 
that allows for timely and appropriate responses to the warnings to avoid ground 
collision. Since TA WS warnings are intended to be heard infrequently and only 
in dire circumstances, it was an absolute requirement that there be no ambiguity in 
the words or voice inflection used. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TAWS PROGRAMATICS 
TA WS utilizes a collection of existing and developing systems within the 
Hornet and Super Hornet. The Tactical Aircraft Moving MAp Capability 
(T AMMAC) provides the Digital Map Computer (DMC) in which the Digital 
Terrain Elevation Database (DTED) is stored. The Tactical Aircraft Mission 
Planning System (TAMPS) generates and loads DTED in the on-board aircraft 
T AMMAC system via standard PCM CIA cards. The Joint Helmet Mounted 
Cueing System (JHMCS) is a system unrelated to the operation of TA WS. The 
TAMMAC replaces existing avionics hardware in the avionics bay. Because 
T AMMAC is compact, it creates enough space for the avionics hardware of the 
JHMCS. Thus, in order to install the JHMCS within the F/A- 1 8  CID Hornet, 
acquisition of T AMMAC is required. T AMMAC was deployed operationally for 
the first time on the F/A- 1 8  E/F Super Hornet in the summer of 2002, with TAWS 
slated for second deployment on the Super Hornet in FY 03 . TAMMAC, and 





PREP ARING FOR TA WS FLIGHT TEST 
TEST PLANNING 
Tactically realistic tes ting of a CFIT protection sys tem, that is an 
emergency sys tem providing a last-ditch warning, requires s ignificant planning. 
When flying an agile, tactical aircraft against actual terrain, if the system does not 
operate properly, the aircraft will likely be beyond the point of safe terrain 
clearance. Obviously, this is an unacceptable risk in flight test. The conundrum 
then lies in how to safely and adequately tes t a CFiT protection sys tem without 
creating a mishap. Tes ting at altitude is desirable for risk reduction but it has 
some less desirab le consequences that mus t be cons idered, such as: reduced 
aircraft performance, less accurate data, and absence of visual ground rush cues to 
the pilot. Aircraft turn and engine performance at alti tude is obvious ly much less 
than jus t  above the ground. If the testing were conducted at altitude, then the data 
ob tained would result in recovery cues presented to the pilot sooner than required 
when at lower altitudes . This is the definition of a nuisance cue. Perhaps more 
importantly, in testing at altitude , the pilot's perception of a nuisance warning 
degrades due to the absence of visual ground rush cues. This may ultimately 
result in reduced protection because the algorithm may have been tailored 
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to eliminate "perce ived" nuisances that would no t have been nuisances had the 
testing been done in close proximity to the ground. Therefore, the ideal 
environment to test TA WS would be as c lose to the ground as safely possible. 
Fo rtunately, there have been many years of ex perience testing GPWS that 
provided an excellent foundation for TA WS testing. The co mbination of min imal 
buff er altitudes, s imulation, and re-s timulation of flight data in the s imulator 
proved to be the recipe for robus t yet s treamlined testing while limiting risk to 
aircrew and aircraft. 
Two catego ries of testing were required for TA WS: nuisance cue and · .  
CFIT pro tection tes ting. Nuisance cue testing was the eas iest to plan as 
operationally representative maneuvers were perfo rmed with no additional safety 
requirements or  concerns . Normal eve ryday fly ing and tac tics could be flown 
with exis ting training to see if there were any nuisance cues . CFIT pro tection was 
much more difficult to plan as ex tre me flight regimes and airc raft attitudes were 
required to be tested. Fl ight test required on-board high-speed data recording as 
well as real- time monitoring and reco rding of flight test and safety parameters. 
Throughout TA WS testing, an overall build-down test approach was utilized for 
altitudes and build- up for airs peeds and dive angles . 
2 1  
TEST SCHEDULE 
Developmental flight test of TAWS consisted of three planned flight 
phases. The first two flight test phases were Developmental testing on the F/A-
1 8C/D and F/A-1 8E/F respectively. The third phase was Verification and 
Validation (V&V) of the final TAWS software build common to both the F/A-
1 8C/D and E/F. Planned flight test location and dates were: Phase 1 - F/A-1 8D, 
Naval Air Station (NAS) Patuxent River, July-August 2000, Phase 2 - F/A-1 8F, 
NAS China Lake, November-December 2001 , Phase 3 - F/A-1 8D and F/A-1 8F, 
NAS Patuxent River and NAS China Lake, April-June 2002. 
TEST AIRCRAFf INSTRUMENTATION 
During Phase 1 testing, the mission computer (MC) operational flight 
program (OFP) was not capable of providing the required TA WS inputs. Making 
a change to the MC OFP to do this testing would have been both costly and time 
consuming, especially when interface changes may have been required during 
development testing. To conduct flight testing without requiring MC software 
changes, the Navigation Avionics Platform Integration Emulator (NAPIE) system 
was used to provide in-flight simulation of altitude to the aircraft mission 
computers. The NAPIE system fed the resident MCs the altered elevation data to 
create the artificial raising of the terrain to provide the safety buffers. This 
resulted in testing in relatively close proximity to the ground with safety b�ffer 
altitudes that caused TA WS to believe the aircraft was lower than the actual flight 
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condition.  The NAPIE system provided a multitude of functions to create this 
necessary interface between the new TA WS functional ity in the DMC and the rest 
of the host- airc raft' s avionics. Initiall y, NAPIE collected the aircraft l ocation and 
attitude input data required by the TA WS algorithm. Next, it re-packed the data 
into a se t of newly defined data bus mess ages and sent the mess ages to the DMC. 
Subsequently, it polled the DMC for the newly defined TAWS output messages. 
Next, it forwarded flight test data and any TA WS alerts to the dis plays . Finall y, it 
recorded data for post-flight analysis .  NAPIE us age became obsole te on second 
and subsequent flight test  phases as the al titude buffers became se ttable via the 
flight test pages. The flight tes t  pages were al ready res ident in the miss ion 
computer software configuration set and no re-writing the MC OFP was required. 
USE OF SIMULATION 
Ground based flight s imulation was an absolute requirement  for the testing 
of TA WS . First, the proper func tional ity of the TA WS algorithm was tested in a 
risk-free, controlled environment. Second, test plan projections of in-flight 
TA WS warning al ti tudes were verified with an ex ternal and independen t TA WS 
truth model . Third, stimulation of the TA WS algorithm with previous GPWS 
fl ight test  data was used for a pe rformance comparison with GPWS and 
evaluation of improvements incorporated in TA WS . Fourth, both test pilots and 
test safety pilots flew the test  profiles in the s imulator fo r famil iarity and risk 
reduction prior to ac tual fl ight test. Fifth, pilot proficienc y in TA WS test 
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maneuvers was maintained during delays between test flights and phases. Sixth, 
following flight test re-stimulation of the simulator with actual TA WS flight data 
was conducted to complete regression testing and identify problem areas more 
accurately. As a result, prior to the first flight test ofTAWS over 500 hours of 
simulation development, testing, and training were conducted. 
MAXIMIZING SAFETY 
There was a heightened sense of awareness of Safety during test planning. 
The desire to have the aircraft tested as close to the ground as possible for 
accurate aircraft performance and pilot perception was delicately balanced with 
how much of an altitude buffer was required during CFIT protection testing. Due 
to the fast paced nature of the testing so close to the earth, it was decided the 
ground support team should include a separate safety observer external to the data 
collection and monitoring effort to provide the essential additional layer of safety 
for risk reduction. Additionally, specially designed displays were developed for 
both the test conductor and safety observer. The displays integrated real-time 
critical flight parameters and tolerances without the need to decipher strip charts 
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Figure 7 
TAWS SAFETY OBSERVER DISPLAY 
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CHAPTER S 
TA WS FLIGHT TEST 
TEST AIRCRAFf DESCRIPTIONS 
The primary test vehicle for Phase 1 testing ofTAWS was an F/A- 1 8D, 
figure 8. A dual-crewed, twin-engine fighter/attack aircraft, the F/A- 1 8D was 
also used for previous GPWS flight test. The F / A- 1 8  Hornet first flew in 1 978 
and entered operational service with the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps in 1 983. 
The Hornet was originally built by McDonnell Douglas Aircraft which has 
since become part of the Boeing Company. The F/A- 1 8  Hornet was the first 
tactical aircraft designed from the ground up as a true multi-role aircraft equally 
Figure 8 
F/A-1 8D HORNET 
Photograph by the Author 
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capable in both air-to-air and air-to-ground mission roles. The aircraft is 56 ft 
long and has a wingspan of 38 ft. It weighs approximately 24,000 lbs empty and 
has a maximum takeoff weight of 5 1,900 lbs with full fuel and combinations of 
ordnance. Two General Electric F404-GE-400 engines rated at approximately 
10,700 pounds military thrust and 16,000 pounds in maximum afterburner power 
the aircraft. As a fighter, the Hornet can carry heat-seeking Sidewinder missiles 
and radar guided Sparrow and Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air missiles. As 
an attack aircraft, the Hornet can carry a wide variety of smart weapons, rockets, 
cluster munitions, air-to-ground missiles, mines and freefall bombs. The Hornet 
is capable of a maximum speed of approximately 1. 75 Mach and a service ceiling 
of 50,000 ft. The Hornet has been exported to many countries and today sees 
service in Australia, Canada, Finland, Kuwait, Malaysia, Spain, and Switzerland. 
A more detailed description of the aircraft is contained in the F/A-18 A-D 
NATOPS manual. 
The primary test vehicle for Phase 2 testing of TA WS was an F / A-l 8F, 
figure 9. A dual-crewed, twin-engine fighter/attack aircraft, the F/A-18F had not 
previously been used as a test aircraft for GPWS or TA WS. The F / A-18E/F 
Super Hornet first flew in the fall of 1995 and entered operational service with the 
U.S. Navy in the summer of 2002. 
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Figure 9 
F/A- 1 8F SUPER HORNET 
Photograph Courtesy of the Boeing Company 
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The Super Hornet is built by the Boeing Company. The F/A- 18E/F Super 
Hornet was des igned as an affordable, more capable, more survivable, more lethal 
successor to the Heritage Hornet. Another true multi-role aircraft, the Super 
Hornet excels in bo th air- to-air and air- to-ground miss ion roles . The Heritage 
Ho rnet through upgrades throughout its lifetime has rapidly been reaching its 
limits for future growth while the Super Hornet provides the capability to embrace 
future hardware and software growth for the next proj ec ted 20 years . 12  The 
aircraft is 60 ft lo ng and has a wingspan of 42 ft. It weighs approximately 32,000 
l bs empty and has a maximum takeoff weight of 66,000 lbs with full fuel and 
combinatio ns of ordnance. Two General Elec tric F4 14-GE- 100 engines rated at 
approximately 1 3 ,900 pounds mil itary thrus t and 20,700 pounds in max imum 
afterburner power the aircraft. As a fighter, the S uper Hornet can carry the same 
co mbinatio ns of air- to-air miss iles as the Heritage Hornet. As an attack aircraft, 
the Super Hornet can carry the same wide variety air- to-ground weapo ns but with 
an additional 2 wing pylon s tations, it has a much larger payload capabil ity . The 
Super Hornet is capable of a maximum speed of approximately 1 .7 5  Mach and a 
service ceil ing of 50,000 ft. The Super Hornet is c urrently only sl ated for service 
with the U.S Navy, but may see service with foreign countries in the future. A 
more detailed description of the aircraft is co ntained in the F/A- 1 8  E/F NATOPS . 
manual . 
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TA WS FLIGHT TEST MANEUVERS 
The first flight of each test phase was dedicated to functional testing of 
TA WS. This started with verification of the altitude buffer settings and their 
proper operation. Next, an evaluation of the accuracy of the DTED data with 
aircraft positioning was conducted. Finally, verification of the graceful 
degradation of TA WS when DTED data was not present was required. Once 
functional testing was complete, testing during flight maneuvers could begin. 
Low-level flight was conducted on standard visual navigation low-level 
routes at 500 and then 200 ft AGL to determine the extent of nuisance cues. 
These low-level routes are those same routes throughout the country in use every 
day by our military aircraft for tactical training. With successful results from the 
original low-level flight, low- levels were then re-flown at the same AGL altitude 
of 200 ft but with altitude buffers artificially raising the ground elevation. For 
these second low-level tests, the cockpit interface (pilot warning) was turned off 
resulting in TA WS operating behind the scenes. This produced a very large 
number of warnings recorded by the instrumentation for evaluation of TA WS 
performance without the large numbers of nuisance cues distracting to the pilot. 
No additional safety risk was added by subduing the TA WS warnings as all 
Hornets and Super Hornets currently conduct this type of training without TA WS 
installed in the aircraft. Low-level routes in the NAS China Lake operating area 
provided a much more mountainous region to test TA WS when compared to the 
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routes in the east coast areas . Subsequently, the fli ght test data gathered du ring 
these low-levels was used to re-stimulate TAWS in the simulato r to determine the 
accu racy of the warnings that were reco rded. This technique permitted an 
evaluation of the effects of DTED errors on the warning altitudes and the 
potential for nuisance and/or late warnings .  
Low Altitude Tactics (LAT) flying was conducted on the Patuxent River test range 
with real-time telemetry to evaluate the presence of any nuisance cues. LAT 
differs from low-level fli ght, as it is much more tactically aggressive . LAT 
employs terrain masking and demands maximu m pilot pe rformance to maneuver 
and maintain the aircraft down at the absolute minimum altitude. LAT flying 
utilizes a very strict set of dive recove ry rules that gives the pilot exact dive 
angles and altitudes they use as gates to step down to the low altitude envi ronment 
(approximately 200 ft AGL) in the most expeditious manner. Once in the low 
altitude envi ronment, three-dimensional maneuve rs are utilized to allow the pilot 
to practice reacting to defeat threat su rface-to -air weapons and return as quickly 
as possible to the low altitude envi ronment. LAT was the most demanding test 
for the TA WS system itself. Testing was conducted at speeds ran ging fro m 400 
to 500 knots in three-dimensional maneuve rs pulling load facto rs of 4 to 5 all in 
close proximity to the ground. The LAT envi ronment is highly dynamic flying 
and the re is little time for TA WS to gene rate an effective CFiT warning if a 
potential condition were to develop. 
3 1  
Operationally representati�e minimum altitude weapons delivery 
maneuvers were performed at dive angles of 1 5  to 45 deg to evaluate the presence 
of any nuisance cues. During this testing normal weapons dive deliveries were 
conducted. The roll-in altitudes to start the simulated ground attack varied as the 
dive angles varied. For shallower dive angles lower roll-in altitudes were used. 
Normally the pilot initiates recovery from the dive at a predetermined minimum 
altitude in order to avoid a threat weapon system or weapons fragmentation 
effects. In this case, TA WS testing was conducted to assess its performance for 
the pilot that fixated on the target too long and did not initiate the pre-planned 
recovery. For TA WS testing, the aircraft recovery was delayed well beyond 
normal parameters with recovery only initiated at either the TA WS warning or the 
minimum weapons release cue (Break-X). The Break-X, a large X displayed in 
the pilot's Heads-Up Display (HUD), indicates there is insufficient altitude for the 
weapon to arm properly once released. 
The final portion of the flight test was the most dynamic for the test 
aircrew and aircraft. This portion evaluated the CFiT protection and was 
conducted with various levels of safety altitude buffers to simulate the ground, as 
shown in figure 10. 
32 
I -
Warning • • • • • -...: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  
Altitude '- ' ' Teminate 
Run 
Altitude 
-, Expected Recovery ' 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . �""· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·"· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·  . . , ; .. .._ - -
• • •. ._ Worst Case Recovery 
MinimLm • •• / • • Bcttom • • • 
• • •  •• Out Altitude • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  : ,...-. '\ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  ■ • • •  
(DIVE) 
Ground level 
Highest terrain• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • 
elevation 
Sea Level ... · ·····-·-····· 
Figure 10 
CFiT PROTECTION EVALUATION WITH SAFETY BUFFER 
33 
CFIT protection flights consisted of the Test Pilot in the front cockpit with 
a Safety Test Pilot in the rear cockpit. To enable a thorough evaluation of CFiT 
protection for the pilot who has had a loss of situational awareness, it was 
required the Test Pilot have little or no knowledge of the aircraft attitude and state 
prior to the warning. Prior to the test event, the Test Pilot closed his eyes, 
positioned his head away from the HUD (i.e. looking high over his shoulder), and 
conducted some mental task (i .e. count backwards from 100 by 4' s ). The Safety 
Test Pilot then maneuvered the aircraft to the test condition. Test conditions 
ranged from 1 50 KCAS to transonic airspeeds, level to 120 deg of roll attitude, 
level to downward 45 deg pitch attitude, and at aircraft gross weights varying 
from 29,000 to 5 1 ,000 lbs. At the TAWS aural warning, the Test Pilot opened his 
eyes and responded as quickly as possible to recover the aircraft - as if his life 
depended on it. The entire Test Pilot's response and recovery technique to the 
TA WS warning was measured. Reactions to warnings and handling of 
recoveries to include initial reaction, intuitiveness of the aural and visual cues, 
bottom out altitudes, load factor-onset rates, roll rates, and peak load factor were 
all evaluated. Test Pilot comments were also recorded on timeliness of warnings, 
Pilot-to-Vehicle Interface (PVI) issues and system operation. Any recoveries 
deemed a "Crash" ( descent below altitude buffer or simulated ground) were 
evaluated real-time to determine applicability of further testing during that flight 
as well as further re-stimulation of that same maneuvers data in the simulator 




FLIGHT TEST PHASES AND SOFTWARE CHANGES 
PHASE l - DEVELOPMENTAL 
Flight test of TA WS began on 5 Jul 00 at NAS Patuxent River, Maryland. 
F/A-18D flight test totaled 18.6 flight hours in 12 sorties. 
Following Phase 1 flight test and evaluation of the data, TA WS entered a 
revision phase for the software. Changes incorporated for Build 2 or version 1. 7 
of the software included accounting for potential errors in the DTED in 
mountainous terrain, increase in pilot response time, and refinement of recovery 
trajectories. Most of the refinement of the recovery trajectories was focused on 
aircraft performance in the transonic region. The F/ A-18 flight controls 
automatically implement a "G-Bucket" or a reduction in available load factor in 
the transonic region to preclude an overstress situation when encountering 
transonic longitudinal pitch-up. This refinement was aimed at correctly modeling 
the envelope of the "G-Bucket". 13  The Build 2 or version 1.7 was completed and 
ready for flight test in February 2001. 
PHASE 2 - DEVELOPMENTAL 
Flight test of Phase 2 - F/A-18F, NAS China Lake, was conducted October 
through January 2002. Flight test totaled 16.6 hours in 15 sorties . Phase 2 flight 
test was the first test of TA WS on the Super Hornet using all production hardware 
and software. Although flight test was conducted on a similar airframe in Phase 
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1, the Super Hornet had not conducted any GPWS or TA WS testing and therefore 
was considered a new airframe with a need for increased functional testing. 
Following the successful completion of the functional testing, nuisance and CFIT 
testing commenced. Once baseline performance was validated in the new 
airframe a reduction in the number of flight test events was possible due to the 
increased fidelity of the F / A-18 E/F simulation over the Heritage Hornet 
simulation. As NAS China Lake was a new test environment and new test aircraft 
for TA WS and the TA WS test team, there was added work in the creation of the 
TA WS real-time safety observer displays in a new telemetry environment as well 
as assimilation ofF/A-18 E/F operations procedures. 
Following Phase 2 flight test and evaluation of the data, TAWS entered 
the next revision phase for the software. Changes were incorporated for versions 
1.8 and the final test version of 1.9. Improvements included incorporating a 
lateral stick predictor to better forecast bank angles as well as refine previous "G­
Bucket" corrections. Flight test indicated that the previous "G-Bucket" modeling 
had been too conservative. TA WS was not accurately p redicting what the Flight 
Control System was doing with the available load factor. 14  Available load factor 
modeling was changed and version 1.9 was ready for the Verification and 
Validation test phase in March 2002. 
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PHASE 3 - VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
Flight test of Phase 3 - F/A- 18D and F, NAS China Lake and Patuxent 
River, was conducted June through September 2002. Flight test totaled 7.7 hours 
in 7 sorties for the Heritage Hornet and 12.0 hours in 10 sorties for the Super 
Homet. 1 5  Phase 3 flight test utilized all production hardware and software on 
both airframes under test. Phase 3 also was conducted completely with version 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
TAWS WORKS! 
Test data from developmental and V & V testing indicate TA WS operated 
as designed and the design was good. The TA WS algorithm successfully and 
accurately incorporated DTED and aircraft positioning from GPS to provide 
timely cues to the aircrew. TA WS visual and aural cues were correct and with 
proper sensing. Warnings provided directive cueing that was not misinterpreted. 
Pilots were able to recover quickly and normally with slightly less altitude loss 
than was predicted. There were minimal nuisance cues during developmental 
phases and the V & V phase uncovered no nuisance cues. TA WS also 
demonstrated a high degree ofreliability with no in-flight or in-aircraft failures 
noted. 1 5  
TESTING OF CFiT PROTECTION IS LIMITED WITH NAFOD 
(NO APPARENT FEAR OF DEATH) 
The use of safety buffer altitudes during flight test greatly affects the 
pilot's perception ofrecovery. One cannot see the artificially raised terrain ­
"virtual ground", additionally the height above the buffer altitude is not displayed 
in the HUD. Therefore, during the recovery, the true proximity to the "ground" is 
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not realized. Even in the simulator where the aircraft is flown without altitude 
buffers, the pilot knows that it is 'just a simulator" and No Apparent Fear Of 
Death (NAFOD) is present. The NAFOD phenomenon is an issue during TAWS 
testing because the pilot tends to be more conservative during the recovery, which 
may lead to more "Crashes". The pilot may pay more attention to observing 
operational techniques and limits in order not to overstress the aircraft than would 
otherwise be done if indeed his life depended upon the recovery. In addition, 
pilots tend to be more aggressive during testing in the simulator due to NAFOD 
and lack of proprioceptive or 'seat-of-the-pants ' cueing. This leads to problems 
when modifying the TA WS algorithms to eliminate the nuisance warnings - that 
is when they would not have been nuisance warnings if they had been received in 
flight. TA WS has been tested through the gamut of fleet representative 
maneuvers and nuisance cues have been virtually eliminated. It is anticipated that 
without the limitation of NAFOD (present during flight test), the fleet operator 
when confronted with a "real" TA WS warning of a potential CFiT condition and 
the accompanying adrenaline boost will exceed the ground clearance predicted by 
TAWS. 
REQUIREMENT FOR WELL DEFINED ABORT CRITERIA AND 
BACKUP SAFETY REDUNDANCY 
During all phases of TA WS testing there were no close calls or major 
safety concerns. This was mainly due to the detailed safety processes in place 
during the tests. Expected warning altitudes were calculated, verified, and tested 
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in the simulator prior to flight. Terminate run altitudes were calculated and 
modeled based on aircraft performance in a worst-case recovery, completely 
independent of TAWS warnings. The Safety Test Pilot, Test Conductor, and 
Safety Observer all had independent views of the test event and communications 
enabling an abort of the event at any time. All efforts to reduce risk appeared to 
have been successful as dynamic flight test in close proximity to the ground was 
conducted safely. 
USE OF SIMULATION FOR RISK REDUCTION AS WELL AS 
REDUCING PROGRAM COSTS 
Simulation has been and will continue to be critical to the development 
and testing of TA WS even as TA WS moves on to other airframes for test. The 
Manned Flight Simulator at Patuxent River was the link between math models 
and integration into aircraft systems and hardware. Simulation validated these 
models as much as possible prior to flight test. Various test techniques were 
explored and subsequently refined in the simulator allowing identification of the 
most effective techniques for flight test. Test Pilots, Safety Test Pilots, Test 
Conductors, and Safety Observers were trained on TA WS and rehearsed the test 
events prior to conducting the events airborne. Once the simulation models were 
validated, actual flight test data was re-flown, or re-stimulated in the simulator, to 
allow for dynamic analysis without the requirement to re-fly the test thus reducing 
program costs. 
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NEED FOR AN ACCURATE DIGITAL TERRAIN ELEVATION DATA 
For TA WS to work accurately, precise aircraft position and elevation of 
the surrounding terrain is a requirement. While GPS was able to place the TA WS 
test aircraft position within 50 m horizontally and 30 m vertically with level 1 
DTED data, re-arced DTED was determined to be accurate only to approximately 
138 ft (approximately 42 m) vertically. The DTED was required to be re-arced 
due to T AMMAC system requirements. T AMMAC requires that DTED 
gridposts must match one-for-one the pixels on the map display. This results in a 
re-arcing (under-sampling) of the gridpost locations existing in the DTED thereby 
changing the elevation accuracy. 16  DTED, for government use, is currently 
available only from National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and most 
recent data utilizing various spheroid conventions is 1966, now 35 years old. 
Therefore, more up to date DTED is required to make TA WS as accurate as 
possible. Improved DTED should be available in December 2002 after the data 
from the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) conducted on the Shuttle 
Transport System Mission 99 (STS-99) is processed and released. This SRTM 
data will be at the DTED level 2 accuracy of 23 m horizontally and 18 m 
vertically. Yet even with the better data, as currently configured TAMMAC is 
incapable of improving due to the hardware constraints. TA WS warnings are 
only as good as the precise location of the aircraft in all three dimensions and the 
4 1  
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ability to compare that to the elevation at a precise location over the ground. 
Therefore, TAMMAC hardware will need to be improved to allo w TAWS to 
reach its full potential. 
SYSTEMS INTEGRATION OF AN ADDITIONAL AUDIO WARNING 
SYSTEM 
The F / A-18 already incorporates a variety of aural warnings thro ugh an 
Amplifier Co ntro l, Intercommunication (ACI). The addition of TAWS resulted in 
a competition between existing aural warnings and new aural TA WS warnings. 
This is due to the existing system scheme where a currently playing vo ice cue 
cannot be interrupted and must play to completion. It was observed that if any 
existing aural warning was being presented, then the TA WS aural warnings were 
masked completely and only the visual HUD warning was presented to the pilot. 
As stated earlier, the aural warnings are the primary method of  alerting the pilot. 
When confronted with an impending CFiT condition, there can be no other more 
important aural cues, to include the Radar Altimeter warning, than the TA WS 
warnings. If the aircraft inadvertently impacts the ground, the rest just does not 
matter. Therefore, the ACI needs to be modified to allow TAWS warnings to 
supercede all other aural warnings. 
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OBTAIN TEST SOFTWARE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, FOR SINE DOES 
NOT EQUAL COSINE 
As with most complex algorithms, simple errors can and do exist. Flight 
test software passed the safety-of-flight evaluation and rapidly began a 
compressed pre-flight test period. During simulation test and later flight test, 
intermittent nuisance cues were being presented when the aircraft was on 
southerly headings. fr was determined that within the Build 1 algorithm, there 
was a cosine function when there should have been a sine function. This simple 
error was fully responsible for the nuisance cues. Ideally, if one can get software 
systems to a simulation evaluation early enough, small problems such as this can 
be identified in sufficient time to allow for a fix prior to flight test. Subsequent to 
Build 1, all software errors were identified and corrected in the laboratory and 
simulation environment prior to actual flight test. 
PILOT RESPONSE TIME IS THE CRITICAL VARIABLE 
The highly complex algorithm of TA WS is constantly computing not one 
but two recovery trajectories with a multitude of changing parameters such as 
airspeed, altitude, pitch rate, roll rate, vertical velocity, etc. The one constant in 
the equation is the set Pilot Response Time (PRT) value. This is the time that 
TA WS must back up from where it figures the aircraft response must be initiated 
back to the time the warning is presented to the pilot. Originally, the PRT was 
set at 1.0 sec. This resulted in 8 crashes and 39 saves. After re-stimulation of 
flight data and experimenting with varying the PRT, the PRT has been changed to 
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1 .3 sec in Build 2. Simulation results indicate the new PR T will result in 3 
crashes and 44 saves without any increase in nuisance rate. 1 0  Subsequent flight 
test indicated that the 1 .3 seconds was the good compromise between warnings 
that were too early - 'nuisance' - and warnings that came too late - 'crashes' .  
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CHAPTER 7 
FUTURE GROWTH AND PLANS 
TA WS contains a generic algorithm and can therefore be tailored to any 
aircraft. Thus far it has only been tailored for and tested on the F/A- 1 8, but any 
aircraft capable of installing a T AMMAC ( or TAMMAC-like) system and GPS 
capability can make a predictive CFiT protection system a reality. For other U.S .  
Navy and Marine Corps aircraft slated to receive TAWS, testing should be 
slightly easier as TA WS conducted its first flight test on the most dynamic aircraft 
with the most widely varied flight envelope. 
The possible incorporation of a pilot-selectable TAWS threshold option 
for low altitude flight is being considered. Currently the system provides only 
last-ditch warnings and assumes the aircraft can and will fly low altitude on every 
mission. In reality, low altitude training missions represent a small percentage of 
flights. With a low-altitude selectable option, CFiT protection can be improved 
by increasing the terrain clearance altitude in the algorithm for the majority of 
flights where there is no intent to go below a nominal 500 ft AGL except for 
landing. 
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Future growth capability envisioned for TA WS includes fusion of data 
from additional or improved sensors, obstacle avoidance, windshear detection, 
and monitoring of pilot responses to ensure sufficient corrective action is taken. 5 
The philosophy of "no nuisance warnings" allows for future development 
of an auto recovery capability within TA WS. An automatic recovery system must 
be nuisance-free ( or very nearly) or the system is doomed to failure. The TA WS 
design includes "hooks" for automatic recovery of the aircraft. Further 
development is required for the flight control laws and TA WS commands before 
such a system can be tested. This requires, however, a paradigm shift in the CFiT 
protection approach from passive (pilot controlled) to active (automatic) aircraft 
recovery systems. 
Incorporating the radar mapping of the earth data from the recent Space 
Shuttle Endeavor (STS-99/SRTM) mission will provide a much higher resolution 
database (DTED) to the TA WS algorithm. When it becomes available and with 
improvements in T AMMACs ability to process it, this highly accurate mapping 
data will provide the needed improvement to the DTED to allow TA WS to reach 





The Terrain Awareness Warning System took its first flight in an ongoing 
effort to provide pilots who have lost situational awareness with the best possible 
cueing to avoid controlled flight into terrain. For the first time, Navy and Marine 
Corps aviators will have a robust, predictive system that provides CFiT cueing 
regardless of aircraft location, attitude, or radar altimeter function. Through the 
effective use of modeling and simulation, both the number of flight test events 
and risk, were reduced to manageable levels. Even though the testing of TA WS 
required flight test in close proximity to the ground, the use of Safety Test Pilots, 
additional safety observers, buffer altitudes and independent terminate run 
altitudes provided for a safe flight test period. TA WS stands complete with 
Developmental test and ready to begin Operational test in October 2002. Once 
complete TAWS will be poised to begin saving lives of operational F/A-18 
aviators as well as be incorporated into many additional types of airframes 
throughout the fleet. 
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